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In this paper, I shall examine a general question that cuts across the different subjects 
discussed in the present volume, that is, the distributional constraints based on word 
content. The label ‘content-based restrictions’ covers a wide array of heterogeneous, 
although interconnected structures. The main aim of this paper is to turn it into an 
orderly map. 
 When one thinks of content-based restrictions, the first notion that comes to mind 
is collocation. In this paper, however, I do not speak of collocations for two reasons. 
First of all, although often used to refer to a variety of different data, this cover notion 
easily leads one to think of a unitary set of structures, flattening relevant differences 
and discouraging an in-depth differential analysis. Secondly, some current definitions 
of collocations (see for instance Grossman / Tutin 2002, 2003; Mel’čuk 2003, 
Mel’čuk / Polguère 2006; Orlandi, in this volume, § 1.1, for an overview) include 
both phraseology and word formation, which however are located outside the domain 
of distribution for both phraseological units and compound words have a distribution 
but not a distributional structure. They occur in constructions but their inner structure 
is not the outcome of a combinatory process. Like formal syntactic constraints, by 
contrast, content-based constraints presuppose construction and distributional 
structure, a datum that leaves no room for phraseological combinations of lexemes on 
the one hand and word formation on the other. 
 After examining some different ideas on lexicon to be found within contemporary 
linguistics and their manifold relations with conceptual contents and syntactic 
structures (§ 1), I shall suggest some criteria that enable us to identify three layers of 
content-based distributional restrictions, namely lexical solidarities, consistency 
criteria and cognitive models (§ 2). In the final section, I shall hypothesise that the 
three layers form a hierarchy, analyse the relation of each with lexical structures, 
lexical contents and formal syntax and examine the place of each in dictionaries (§ 
3). 
 
1. Conceptual contents, lexicon and syntax 
 
Lexicon is far from being a univocal concept. First, there is not a shared notion of 
lexicon in linguistics. Furthermore, to speak of distributional restrictions implies 
analysing lexemes in use in syntagmatic structures, a methodological stance that rises 
some specific questions unknown to more traditional analyses based on systematic 
lexical values out of use. On the one hand, lexemes in use carry with them a nebula 
of information that goes far beyond the borderline of anything it is reasonable to call 
lexicon. On the other, when dealing with content-based distributional constraints it is 
impossible not to call into question the relationship with formal distributional 
constraints belonging to syntax.  
 If we consider the scientific literature of the last century, the documented notions 
of lexicon range between two opposite ends. According to the structural tradition 
(Trier 1931(1973), 1932(1973); Lyons 1963; 1977, Coseriu 1967; 1968), lexicon is a 
language-specific structure like phonology or grammar. As Lyons (1963: 37) puts it, 
“Each language must be thought of as having its own semantic structure, just as it has 
its own phonological and grammatical structure”. The consequence of such a 
statement is that the formal organisation of lexical structures is highlighted at the 
expenses of substantive conceptual contents. At the opposite end, some cognitive 
linguists share the idea that lexicon contains any kind of conceptual and factual 
information connected in some way or other to the use of words. This methodological 
stance questions the borderline between lexical and encyclopaedic information on the 
one hand and the borderline between the symbolic and the indexical dimension on the 
other. The former point is underlined by Haiman (1980: 331) when he claims that 
“dictionaries are encyclopaedias”. The latter idea is shared by some cognitive 
linguists, among others Croft & Cruse (2004) and Fauconnier (1997), who anchor the 
meaning of sentences in contingent uses, leaving aside the distinction between long-
lasting structures and contingent events and therefore the distinction between the 
symbolic and indexical dimension: “A language expression E does not have a 
meaning in itself; rather, it has a meaning potential (Fauconnier 1992), and it is only 
within a complete discourse and in context that meaning will actually be produced” 
(Fauconnier 1997: 37). 
 The relationship between lexicon and syntax is in turn intricate. In recent years, the 
study of lexicon has been moved from the paradigmatic dimension to the syntagmatic 
one, that is, from the correlations between lexemes within lexical fields to the 
relations between lexemes within the combinatory structure of model sentences. 
According to Gross (2012: Ch. 2), for instance, the relevant unit for lexical analysis 
coincides with a structure formed by a predicative term saturated by its arguments, 
that is, with a model sentence. Against this methodological stance, however, the 
object of lexicography ends up overlapping with the object of syntax to a certain 
extent. Therefore, the question of their interaction comes to the foreground. Insofar as 
lexical meanings have a combinatory dimension, and therefore a distributional 
structure, what is the exact relation between the syntax of meanings, so to speak, and 
the syntax of forms? Once again, the developments of the last decades in linguistics 
suggest two opposite answers.  
 Within a typical formal paradigm, as documented by the classical version of 
generative grammar (Chomsky 1957, 1965), syntactic structures are assumed to be 
independent of any kind of conceptual constraint: “grammar is autonomous and 
independent of meaning” (Chomsky 1957: 17) and “uniquely determines […] 
semantic interpretation” (Chomsky 1966: 5). Syntax is conceived of as formal not 
only in that it has a static form but also, and above all, because it imposes a form on 
the organised concepts. At the opposite end, within functional and cognitive 
approaches, syntax is assumed to be instrumental and iconic or, more specifically, 
diagrammatic. In this light, syntactic structures have neither an autonomous form nor 
a shaping power, but simply mirror independent networks of conceptual relations. 
The active role of syntax is confined to profiling conceptual relations (Langacker 
1987), that is, to imposing a perspective on them (Fillmore 1977). According to Dik 
(1989(1997: 8)), for instance, “Semantics is regarded as instrumental with respect to 
pragmatics, and syntax as instrumental with respect to semantics. In this view there is 
no room for something like an ‘autonomous’ syntax”. The iconic view of syntax, in 
turn, is split into a weak and a strong version. With regard to a weak version, the 
structure of sentences mirrors the structure of long-lasting conceptual models: “the 
linguistic form is a diagram of conceptual structure” (Haiman 1985: 2). With regard 
to a strong version, the structure of sentences is assumed to depict contingent 
experiential situations. According to Langacker (1991(1992: 35)), for instance, the 
meaning of a sentence is the “image” of “a particular event known in full detail”: 
“When we use a particular construction or grammatical morpheme, we thereby select 
a particular image to structure the conceived situation for communicative purposes” 
(Langacker 1991(1992: 12)). Once again, the borderline between the symbolic and 
the indexical dimensions is blurred. In any case, if we assume that syntactic 
structures mirror the structure of complex concepts, syntax is not an autonomous 
structural level but is reduced to the relational dimension of lexicon making room for 
complex conceptual structures and therefore taking the model sentence as its relevant 
unit. According to Langacker (2000: 18), “lexicon and grammar form a continuum, 
structures at any point along it being fully and properly described as symbolic in 
nature”: grammar is a repository of complex structures each of which, like a lexeme, 
has a meaning, or a family of interconnected meanings. In a similar light, 
construction grammar suggests that “Constructions themselves carry meaning” 
(Goldberg 1995: 1). The meaning of a ditransitive construction, for instance, “can be 
argued to be the sense involving successful transfer of an object from an agent to a 
recipient, with the referent of the subject agentively causing this transfer”.  
 
2.  The content-based restrictions: selection restrictions, lexical solidarities and 
cognitive models 
 
This whole range of issues concerning the relation between conceptual structures, 
lexical structures, lexical contents and syntax is developed throughout the history of 
Twentieth Century linguistics, from Porzig to cognitive linguistics.  
 The first linguist who isolated syntagmatic lexical structures, and therefore a first 
type of distributional restrictions grounded on contents, was Porzig (1934), who 
suggested the concept of lexical solidarity soon after Trier (1931) published his 
seminal work on lexical fields, which are paradigmatic lexical structures. In German, 
for instance, the difference between the verbs essen and fressen depends on the nature 
of the subject, which is a human being in the former case and an animal in the latter. 
A lexical solidarity is an asymmetric kind of structure, which connects a determinant 
term with a determined one. The determined term is a relational, unsaturated concept 
– the verb essen, for instance – whereas the determinant term is provided by a class 
of arguments appropriate for its saturation: for instance, the class of human subjects. 
A lexical solidarity contributes to determine the value (Saussure 1916(1974: 116-
117)) of a relational lexeme.  
 Unlike lexical solidarities, which belong to formal lexical analysis, the discovery 
of selection restrictions is one outcome of syntactic research, and in particular of the 
study of the constraints imposed on the distribution of formal classes of words and 
phrases within the structure of the sentence. When looking for the constraints that 
govern the distribution of such formal categories as noun, verb, noun phrase, verb 
phrase, distributional analysis inevitably meets with an independent layer of 
constraints that depend on conceptual contents. A verb like pour, for instance, 
requires a second argument whose form and conceptual content are equally 
constrained: in formal terms, it has the form of a noun phrase – the direct object; in 
conceptual terms, it refers to a concrete liquid substance. According to Harris (1946: 
178), formal constraints belong to syntax, whereas conceptual constraints belong to 
lexicon, which is seen as a “semantic” complement of formal syntax:  
 
there are further limitations of selection among the morphemes so that not all sequences 
provided by the formulae [that is, the formal schemata of syntagmatic structures] 
actually occur. Individual limitations of selection cannot be described in these formulae; 
at best, the most important among them can be stated in special lists or in the dictionary.  
 
 Unlike Harris, Chomsky (1965) considers selection restrictions as a kind of 
syntactic constraints. This methodological stance transfers into linguistics Carnap’s 
idea of a logical grammar (Carnap 1932) that includes both formal and conceptual 
distributional restrictions. Whereas the function of formal constraints is to account for 
the agrammaticality of such ill-formed combinations as This and is perfectly, the 
function of conceptual constraints is to filter out such inconsistent conceptual 
combinations as for instance Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, And Winter pours 
its grief in snow (Emily Brontë), They sleep, the mountain peaks (Alcman1).  
 The idea that selection restrictions belong to syntax was immediately rejected by 
generative semantics (McCawley 1970(1971), Lakoff 1971), which claimed the 
“semantic”, and therefore lexical, nature of selection restrictions. According to 
                                                   
 1. The first line of Alcman’s famous Nocturne, eúdousin d’oréon koryphaí is quoted in the 
English translation by M. L. West, Greek Lyric Poetry, Oxford World’s Classics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993: 35. As Jakobson (1959(1971)) immediately underlined, Chomsky’s move is 
in conflict with the idea of a formal grammar that, like Husserl’s ‘pure grammar’, should be 
independent of any substantive conceptual constraint. If syntactic connections are independent of 
the connected concepts, and in the first place of conceptual consistency, why should formal syntax 
filter out inconsistent combinations? As we shall see below, conflictual complex meanings provide 
both the most powerful argument in favour of formal syntax and a functional justification for it. 
McCawley (1970(1971: 218), selection restrictions “are not restrictions on how 
lexical items may be combined but rather restrictions on how semantic material may 
be combined”. Within the framework of generative semantics, the adjective semantic 
is used in a broad sense; it does not refer to language-specific lexical structures but 
roughly means conceptual, or notional in Jespersen’s (1924: Ch. III) sense. The same 
attitude was inherited some decades later by cognitive and functional scholars: 
according to Lakoff (1987: 539), for instance, “the meanings are concepts in a given 
conceptual system”. The idea that selection restrictions belong to lexicon is now a 
commonplace sanctioned by handbooks (see for instance Leech 1974; Palmer 1976; 
Lyons 1977).  
 On the other hand, within the framework of cognitive linguistics, which neutralises 
the distinction between lexical contents and both cognitive structures, encyclopaedic 
information and contingent data, selection restrictions are seen either as restrictions 
on shared cognitive models (Fillmore 1977) or as beliefs about the world (Haiman 
1980: 345):  
 
semantic constraints and beliefs about the world are not to be distinguished. Thus, 
selection restrictions: the sentence ‘the rock is pregnant’ violates a selection restriction. 
But the categorization of rocks as inanimate and hence, a fortiori, barren, is a belief 
about the world, and one which is not necessarily shared by everyone.  
 
 In addition to that, it should be stressed that functional and cognitive linguists who 
are acquainted with the structural tradition (see for instance Dik 1989(1997: 91) and 
Wierzbicka 1980: 87) equate selection restrictions to lexical solidarities. According 
to Geeraerts (1991: 38), for instance, “syntagmatic semantic relations, known in 
transformational grammar as selection restrictions [...] had actually been discussed 
earlier by Porzig (1934)”. 
 To sum up, linguists use three labels to refer to content-based constraints on the 
distribution of lexemes: lexical solidarities, selection restrictions and restrictions on 
cognitive models. According to some linguists, these labels simply constitute three 
different ways to refer to the same phenomena. The aim of this paper is to argue for 
the opposite hypothesis: lexical solidarities, selection restrictions and cognitive 
constraints, in spite of some surface analogies, represent three profoundly distinct 
categories which are linked by a web of complex and revealing connections. The 
distinction is relevant for the structure and aims of dictionaries. As we shall see 
below, in particular, selection restrictions, unlike lexical solidarities, are never stated 
in current dictionaries, whose aim is to give definitions of isolated words. By 
contrast, if a dictionary is meant to account for the use of words in model sentences – 
if it is “generative” in Gross’s sense, selection restrictions become an essential 
component.  
 
2.1. Selection restrictions and lexical solidarities 
 
Whereas the discovery of selection restrictions is connected to a distributional 
approach to syntactic structures, Porzig’s work lies outside syntax. His idea was not 
to describe distributional limitations based on word content but to identify a 
syntagmatic kind of formal and language-specific lexical structure. As pointed out by 
Coseriu (1967), the function of lexical solidarities is to provide the language-specific 
formal organisation of lexical fields with a peculiar kind of differential features, 
which are not inherent but relational. The couple essen vs fressen, for instance, 
organizes the conceptual area of eating in German thanks to a differential dimension 
that is not based on some inherent features of the verbal content but depends on its 
relation with a specific kind of subject2. This premise already suggests that lexical 
solidarities and selection restrictions are radically different. In order to examine this 
point in detail, we shall now observe some significant instances. 
 The lexical paradigm organising the conceptual area of killing in English contains 
such values as murder, assassinate, slaughter, exterminate, execute, slay, butcher, 
and massacre. Each of these different lexemes is subjected to language-specific 
lexical solidarities, which impose rather arbitrary restrictions on the kinds of being 
that can hold as patient. Murder is restricted to persons;  
 
assassinate adds the restriction that the object must be a person in a position of political 
importance and that the agent has a political motive for killing. Slaughter and butcher 
seem to be terms used primarily for the killing of animals for food [...] Slay is applied to 
humans or higher animals, overlapping somewhat with slaughter, but it has an archaic, 
especially biblical, connotation. Exterminate is usually used for intentionally killing in 
order to get rid of fairly low forms of animal life, e. g. insects, or animals that are 
considered pests, e. g. rats [...] Massacre adds the feature that the object consists of a 
group of people […] Execute is like kill, and adds the qualification that the act is a 
punishment for a crime and is carried out according to the laws or mores of a social 
group” (Lehrer 1974: 123-124).  
 
As the examples show, a language is sovereign when imposing specific restrictions 
on the use of words, but it is so on one condition: all these restrictions are internal to 
the boundaries of consistency, and presuppose it. English can freely legislate about 
what kinds of being can be murdered, slaughtered or massacred, but on the 
preliminary condition that all these beings are mortal, and therefore living beings. It 
is not the task of English to state what kinds of being can die, and therefore be killed. 
Whereas the relation between assassinate and its direct object, which has to refer to a 
person of political importance, is a clear instance of lexical solidarity, the constraint 
                                                   
 2. Lounsbury 1964: 1073-1074) identifies a root meaning correlated with some oppositive 
dimensions: “We shall regard as a paradigm any set of linguistic forms wherein: (a) the meaning of 
every form has a feature in common with the meanings of all other forms of the set, and (b) the 
meaning of every form differs from that of every other form of the set by one or more additional 
features. The common feature will be said to be the ROOT MEANING of the paradigm. It defines the 
semantic field which the forms of the paradigm partition. The variable features define the 
OPPOSITIVE DIMENSIONS of the paradigm”. The classical distinction, however, is not appropriate 
here for the generic concept of eating is not a meaning in German because there does not exist a 
hypernym such as English eat.  
that restricts death to living beings is a clear case of selection restriction. Whereas the 
lexical solidarity is restricted to the English language, selection restrictions belong to 
a more general system of concepts that is shared by a very large community.  
 The relation between selection restrictions and lexical solidarities should now be 
clear: lexical solidarities draw further language-specific restrictions within conceptual 
areas that are by definition consistent, and therefore within the conceptual borderline 
drawn by selection restrictions. If this is true, selection restrictions cannot possibly be 
seen as language-specific lexical structures. Selection restriction are consistency 
requirements that belong to a natural ontology, namely to a sort of conceptual 
constitution shared by a very large number of people that cuts across many different 
linguistic communities and governs not only linguistic expression and thought but 
also, and in the first place, everyday behaviour. The reasons that lead one to think 
that a sentence such as The moon smiles (Blake) has an inconsistent meaning are the 
same that prevent one from asking questions and giving orders to the moon or to a 
tree (Prandi 2004: Ch. 8).  
 The differences between lexical solidarities and consistency criteria are confirmed 
by the observation of conceptual conflicts. 
 The violation of a lexical solidarity is a lexical mistake. Even when it leads to a 
conflict, it does not end up in inconsistency. The utterance John murdered a spider, 
for instance, is conflictual but not inconsistent. In spite of the inappropriate lexical 
choice, the action itself is consistent in that a spider can be killed. The barrier 
between the spider and the act of murdering is not conceptual, but formal lexical. 
This is the reason why lexical conflicts can be considered shallow conflicts. The 
violation of a consistency criterion, on the other hand, gives rise to a process that is 
essentially and irreversibly inconsistent and does not admit a consistent framing. The 
utterance describing a smiling moon, for instance, ascribes to the satellite an action 
that is inconsistent with its essential properties as an inanimate being. What is wrong 
in the utterance is not the choice of the word but the action itself. The barrier between 
the moon and the smile is not just lexical: it is conceptual. This is a case of true 
inconsistency. 
 As any consistent conceptual relation can by definition be framed in consistent 
words, lexical mistakes can be removed by substitution. In the presence of a lexical 
mistake, it is always possible to find a more or less direct path through lexical 
structures, leading to at least one alternative non-conflicting lexeme on the basis of a 
common root meaning. Given an example such as John murdered a spider, for 
instance, the verb can be replaced by kill, the generic hypernym of the field 
containing murder. On the other hand, if we take into account the utterance John 
murdered a calf, the verb can be replaced either by the generic verb kill or by the 
more specific slaughter, which applies a correlative lexical solidarity to the common 
root meaning ‘kill’: John slaughtered a calf.  
 As it is a question of conceptual lawfulness, by contrast, inconsistency cannot be 
removed by lexical substitution. If a poet describes the moon as a smiling creature, no 
consistent alternative formulation can be attained by lexical substitution. There is no 
English verb that is at the same time correlative or structurally connected to smile and 
fit for inanimate beings. What is barred to the moon is not a given lexeme, but the 
whole conceptual area of human expression, no matter what lexeme is used to 
describe it.  
 A last argument in favour of this line of reasoning is offered by translation. Lexical 
structures are by definition language-specific, and so are lexical mistakes, which 
implies that translation does not necessarily preserve them. The anomaly of the 
English utterance The horse is mewing is preserved in French – Le cheval miaule – 
and Italian – Il cavallo miagola – because the same lexical solidarity is shared by all 
three languages. The anomaly of the German sentence Hans frißt, by contrast, 
disappears in English, French and Italian. The translation of an inconsistent meaning, 
for its part, has no effect on the conceptual conflict. In one of his sonnets, the French 
poet Charles Baudelaire attributes to the moon the inconsistent experience of 
dreaming: Ce soir la lune rêve avec plus de paresse, which is translated into English 
word by word as The moon tonight dreams vacantly3. On the sole condition that the 
same system of consistency criteria is shared, whatever language the utterance is 
translated into the inconsistency does not disappear. For the utterance to lose its 
inconsistency, it is not enough to imagine another lexical structure; one has to 
imagine another conceptual landscape – a conceptual picture of world which, unlike 
ours, would allow celestial bodies to dream. For a person grown up within such a 
strange ontology, on the other hand, this utterance would in any case be taken as 
consistent, no matter what language is used to express it. 
 
2.2. Selection restrictions and cognitive models 
 
Cognitive models (Holland & Quinn 1987) impose substantive conceptual 
restrictions on the structure of typical kinds of things and states of affaires. Like 
lexical solidarities and unlike consistency criteria, cognitive models belong to the 
territory of consistent concepts, the same that is circumscribed by consistency 
criteria. Like consistency criteria and unlike lexical solidarities, cognitive models are 
conceptual structures shared by a very large group including many different linguistic 
communities. 
 Cognitive models share an essential property with consistency criteria: neither 
conceptual system depicts a picture of the world as it actually appears, but rather a 
picture of some possible worlds. The two pictures, however, are depicted according 
to different relevance criteria, and therefore each bears a specific relationship to the 
world of real experience.  
 The rule of cognitive modelling is typicality. Cognitive models draw a simplified 
picture of what our shared world would look like if it were inhabited only by typical 
beings behaving in a typical way. The typical world is a poorer version of ours, 
containing nothing more and much less. The typical world, for instance, does not 
contain a single bird unable to fly. 
                                                   
 3. Baudelaire, Ch., The flowers of evil, transl. by James Mc Gowan, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 The rule of consistency is substantive possibility, and therefore conceptual 
lawfulness. Consistency criteria uncover an indefinite set of worlds, including any 
possible worlds that combine in any imaginable way all kinds of being and properties 
compatible with conceptual lawfulness. The inverted world of Baroque poetry, for 
instance, is as admissible as its real counterpart in terms of consistency. Strolling 
through consistent worlds, one could meet swimming birds, flying feathered fish – 
De l’océan de l’air les poissons emplumés (Chevreau) – and floating clouds – I 
wandered lonely as a cloud / That floats on high o’er vales and hills (Wordsworth) – 
under a black sun4: 
 
Le feu brûle dedans la glace 
le soleil est devenu noir (Théophile) 
Fire burns within ice 
the sun has become black 
 Though held to be generally true, cognitive models are sensitive to actual 
experience. They not only admit the possibility of being falsified by experience but 
also actually entail it, for the question about typicality arises only insofar as 
experience makes room for non-typical instances. Most instances that falsify the 
expectations raised by cognitive models are taken as natural: this is the case, for 
instance, of birds that cannot fly. Some others would be seen as somehow odd: to 
come across a feathered fish, for instance, would certainly be an amazing experience. 
All these kinds of being, however, are equally conceivable, because they do not cross 
the boundaries of consistency: cognitive modelling is internal to consistency. By 
contrast, there is no room for inconsistent beings or processes in either actual or 
possible experience. Inconsistent beings and processes such as the dreaming moon or 
sleeping mountains are conceivable only as complex meanings of significant 
expressions, that is, as semantic structures of the symbolic order. 
 
3. Content-based constraints, lexicon and syntax 
 
 Consistency criteria, lexical solidarities and cognitive models are not different 
labels for the same structures but radically different structures; furthermore, they are 
not on a level but form a hierarchy. Selection restrictions hold as general consistency 
criteria whose function is to delimit the territory of shared consistent concepts. 
Within the territory of consistent concepts, each language builds up a network of 
language-specific lexical relations and correlations, among which lexical solidarities 
find their place. Within the same territory of consistent concepts, general cognitive 
models, which are shared by a very large group including many linguistic 
communities, impose substantive constraints on the structure of typical states of 
affairs to be found in common experience. Against this background, we are now 
ready to answer the questions asked at the beginning of this paper: what is the place 
of each kind of constraint within the lexicon or, to put it another way, what idea of 
lexicon is consistent with each kind? What is the place of formal lexical structures, 
                                                   
 4. The examples are taken from Genette (1966: § 1). 
cognitive models and consistency criteria in a dictionary? What is the relationship 
between content-based restrictions and formal syntax? 
 
3.1. Content-based constraints and lexicon 
 
Like semantic fields, lexical solidarities belong to the formal, language-specific layer 
of lexical structures. Although relevant for the description of the inner structure of a 
given language, the formal idea of lexicon is not up to facing the challenge of syntax, 
that is, to providing the conceptual contents needed for the construction of complex 
meanings of complex expressions. In order to perform this task, formal lexical 
structures have to be filled with substantive conceptual contents, which however are 
not language-specific but shared by a larger community. Like Janus, a functionally 
adequate lexicon has two dimensions: it has a linguistic specific form but also a more 
general conceptual content. The formal lexicon is a system of relations and 
correlations between values that belongs to the specific structure of a linguistic 
system. The functional lexicon is a shared repository of consistent and substantive 
conceptual contents. 
 The relevant relations and correlations that build up the formal lexical structure of 
a given language can be identified against the backdrop of any kind of substantive 
information thanks to the commutation test. The only relevant relations and 
correlations that are retained as lexical structures are those that are correlated to 
differences on the expression plane (Hjelmslev 1943(1961); Coseriu 1967; 1968). In 
Latin, for instance, in the area of old age, the conceptual distinction between humans, 
things, and a composite class including animals and vegetables is relevant in that it 
provides the distinction between the meanings of senex, vetus and vetulus with its 
differential dimension (Duchacek 1965: 58). A point is worth underlining here: 
although relevant on linguistic grounds, such classes, and in particular the grouping 
of animals and vegetables, bear no cognitive import. More generally, such lexical 
classes are devoid of conceptual relevance5. 
 Once formal lexical structures have been isolated, we can assume that the 
functional side of the lexicon is an organised repository of concepts and conceptual 
relations. In order to draw a more exact portrait of a functional lexicon, however, we 
have to face two orders of questions. On the one hand, we have to take control over 
two centrifugal drifts that challenge its firmness, that is, the drift towards occasional 
data belonging to the indexical dimension and the drift towards encyclopaedic 
information. On the other hand, within the core of functional lexicon, we have to find 
                                                   
 5. The gap between lexical classes and consistent conceptual classes is underlined by 
metaphorical lexical extensions of the meaning of such relational lexemes as verbs or adjectives. In 
English, for instance, one can harbour, gratify, obey, espouse a desire, which can fuel a project. 
Since they are shared by English speakers, all these uses are consistent: as we have remarked above, 
lexical structures are tautologically consistent. This however implies that the inclusion of wishes, 
boats and human beings in the same lexical class bears no consequence on ontological 
classification.  
a proper place for either layer of substantive conceptual structures, that is, for 
cognitive models and consistency criteria. 
 One condition a substantive content must comply with in order to be included into 
functional lexicon is that it is both long lasting and shared by a wide community of 
speakers. This criterion ideally filters out any kind of contingent datum bound to a 
contingent speech event and occasionally shared by its contingent actors. Let us 
suppose that in order to understand a given message one has to realise that red is the 
colour of Ann’s shirt. Many pieces of contingent information of precisely this kind 
have to be part of the stock of data available to the interpreter when contingent 
interpretative acts are performed within the borders of an occasional interpretation 
field (Prandi 2004: Ch. 1). But it is obvious that the piece of occasional information 
about Ann’s shirt cannot possibly find its place within the lexical definition of the 
word red. The long-lasting datum that red is the colour of blood, by contrast, is a 
relevant cognitive anchor for circumscribing the shared concept. The activation of 
contingent information is a condition for understanding a contingent message, but not 
a condition for understanding the long-lasting meaning of a word such as red. 
 The borderline between lexical contents and encyclopaedic information is at one 
and the same time elusive, as stressed by Haiman (1980: 329), and inescapable: “One 
does not expect to find in a dictionary a compendium of everything that is known 
about horses: if one did, the entry for ‘horse’ alone would be considerably longer 
than an entire dictionary. But where exactly does one stop? And, more important, 
why does one stop?”. Haiman’s question presupposes that lexical and encyclopaedic 
information are similar kinds of data, so that their difference is a pure matter of 
granularity and any boundary an arbitrary choice. However, the difference between a 
lexical definition and an encyclopaedic description is not simply a matter of degree 
within a continuum – “where exactly does one stop?”, as Haiman puts it – but of 
relevance. An encyclopaedic description ideally contains anything people are 
assumed not to know and would like to know about the objects referred to by words, 
and takes for granted anything that can be assumed as shared by everybody. An 
encyclopaedic description of a car, for instance, is not expected to explain at length 
its socially assumed function, whereas one would be surprised not to find in it a set of 
technical and historical data, and an accurate description of different types and 
famous models of cars. This considerable amount of data about cars is likely to 
enrich one’s empirical knowledge. The definition of a concept, by contrast, tries to 
make explicit the assumptions that are ideally shared by everybody, namely 
everything everybody is supposed to take for granted and rely upon when using a 
word. As the nature of these tacit assumptions is not empirical, their explication does 
not expand our body of positive knowledge. This is the reason why a concept, even if 
it necessarily contains some positive information about entities, is not simply a 
selection from encyclopaedic data but belongs to an incommensurable order of 
magnitude. 
 Once the core of the functional lexicon is restricted to a repository of long-lasting 
conceptual structures shared and relied upon by its users, the following step is to 
define the place of the two independent orders of long-lasting and shared conceptual 
structures, that is, cognitive models and consistency criteria. 
 If we move from the structure of lexical information to the structure of 
dictionaries, the first point to be stressed is that consistency criteria are never stated 
in dictionaries. A good dictionary of English, for instance, is expected to state that the 
verb murder denotes “the deliberate and unlawful killing of a person” (Cobuild 
Collins) but not that the consistent use of the verb requires an animate object. A 
possible reason could be that consistency criteria are not language-specific. However, 
this hypothesis is falsified by cognitive models, which, although generally shared, are 
incorporated into definitions. In fact, the real reason lies at a deeper level. If it is true 
that both lexical structures and cognitive models belong to the territory of 
consistency, and that the function of consistency criteria is to circumscribe such a 
territory from outside, the conclusion is that the place of consistency criteria is not 
within the definitions of lexical contents but among the presuppositions of the act of 
defining and more generally of the lexical enterprise. This point is underlined by 
Black (1952(1954: 32)), who compares the consistency conditions of lexical 
definitions to the felicity conditions of speech acts. Just as an act of promise fails if it 
is addressed to a celestial body, the definition of such verbs as murder, assassinate, 
exterminate, kick the bucket or slaughter only makes sense against the presupposition 
– the tautology, in a sense – that death can only be predicated of animate beings. In 
the same way that the presuppositions of consistent actions are never stated but 
simply relied upon when acting, the presuppositions of definitions are not stated but 
simply relied upon when defining. Consistency criteria remain “outside the 
jurisdiction of the definition” is Black’s conclusion. 
 Black’s remark certainly holds for the traditional game of defining, which assumes 
that the object of lexical definitions is provided by consistent conceptual structures. 
In particular, it holds for both formal lexical structures and consistent conceptual 
models of things and processes, which are equally assumed to be consistent. 
However, if the scope of lexical description is moved from the individual lexeme to 
the structure of the model sentence and the aim of a dictionary is not simply to 
describe formal and substantive lexical contents but to account for the distribution of 
lexemes within sentence structures – for uses (emplois), in Gross’s terminology – 
consistency can no longer be taken for granted but is in turn called into question. In 
the same light, consistency criteria can no longer be kept in the background but have 
to be focused on as objects of lexical analysis. When distributional analysis crosses 
the borderline of purely formal syntax to include the syntax of concepts, so to speak, 
Harris’s idea of lexicon as a conceptual complement of formal syntactic distribution 
becomes relevant. In formal distributional terms, namely in terms of formal syntactic 
structures, there is no difference between such a sentence as John poured wine into 
Mary’s glass and And Winter pours its grief in snow (Emily Brontë): both are 
perfectly well formed. The difference is that the former is consistent whereas the 
latter is not. The former builds up a complex meaning that corresponds to a shared 
conceptual model independently accessible to consistent thought, whereas the latter 
builds up a complex meaning that finds no place among consistent concepts. If its 
task, among others, is to account for such a difference, a dictionary seen as a 
systematic description of lexical structures and contents cannot help but contain a 
systematic analysis of consistency criteria. Gross’ model of “generative lexicon”, for 
instance, makes room for them (Gross 2012). In Gross’ model, consistency criteria 
are dealt with in terms of such “hyperclasses” as ‘abstract’, ‘concrete’, ‘human’, 
‘animate’ and ‘vegetable’ and thus distinguished from distributional restrictions 
internal to consistency, including both lexical solidarities and cognitive models, dealt 
with in terms of “object classes”. Gross’ approach suggests that the difference 
between consistency criteria and distributional restrictions internal to consistency is a 
matter of granularity and thus somehow overlooks the essential difference between 
structures that account for consistency and structures that are by definition consistent. 
In spite of this, the room for consistency criteria in a dictionary that focuses on the 
syntax of concepts is out of question. 
 
3.2. Content-based constraints and formal syntax 
 
At this point, we are ready to deal with the last question: the relationship between 
content-based distributional restrictions and formal syntax. 
 If it is conceived of as a systematic description of the consistent distribution of 
lexemes within the structure of model sentences, a dictionary contains a syntax of its 
own – a syntax of concepts. This being the premise, the relevant question is whether 
the syntax of concepts, namely the set of relations displayed by consistent conceptual 
structures and made explicit in a dictionary, is the same as the syntax of forms, 
namely the structure of model sentences. As mentioned above, this question receives 
a positive answer within the framework of cognitive linguistics, and in particular of 
construction grammar: if it is true that they mirror the structure of consistent 
conceptual models, the formal syntactic structures of model sentences coincide with 
the relational dimension of the lexicon. Within such a model, there is no room for an 
autonomous formal syntax, that is, for a distribution of formal classes of expressions 
independent of the consistent distribution of concepts. Borrowing Husserl’s 
(1901(1970: 511)) words, there is no room for “that a priori system of the formal 
structures which leave open all material specificity of meaning”. 
 In my opinion, the idea of a formal syntax coinciding with the relational 
dimensions of lexical contents is falsified by an inescapable datum belonging to the 
common experience of homo loquens: syntax is not only an instrumental device in 
the service of independent and consistent conceptual structures, but also a creative 
device capable of connecting concepts in unexpected ways.  
 The complex conceptual structures that circumscribe the distribution of shared 
concepts are tautologically consistent. The distribution of syntactic classes in formal 
syntactic structures, by contrast, is not constrained by a requirement of consistency. 
The same formal syntactic structures that mirror consistent combinations of concepts 
when used in a purely instrumental way – as for instance in John poured wine into 
Mary’s glass – are capable of connecting concepts in such a way as to challenge the 
shared conceptual lawfulness: And Winter pours its grief in snow. A fortiori, the 
formal structures of syntax are not constrained by lexical solidarities – John 
murdered a spider – and by cognitive models: Fire burns within ice / the sun has 
became black. As Husserl (1901(1970: 511-512)) points out, inconsistent meanings 
do not belong to meaninglessness but are the outcome of a successful formal 
connection of significant parts to form a meaningful whole, or “unified meaning” 
(“einheitliche Bedeutung”). Since they connect concepts in unexpected ways, they 
both document the autonomy of formal syntactic structures and provide a functional 
justification for it (Prandi 1987; 2004). Formal autonomy of syntax is the necessary 
condition for creative connection of concepts. If it is true that lexicon has a syntax, 
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